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Onuora Amobi ·

The GENIUS Act was supposed to be the moment Washington put a leash on stablecoins. Eleven months after President Trump signed it, the leash looks more like a courtesy lanyard, and several of the people holding it used to draw paychecks from the firms now being regulated.
Stablecoin regulation in the United States runs through six federal agencies racing a statutory clock. As that rulemaking nears the finish line, The American Prospect reported on June 24 that crypto firms are getting close to everything they asked for, while the banking lobby watches its objections get filed and quietly outvoted.
That result was not inevitable. It was built.
The GENIUS Act became law on July 18, 2025. By its own terms it takes effect on the earlier of January 18, 2027, or 120 days after final rules are issued. That single sentence shaped everything that followed.
A deadline does not reward the careful. It rewards whoever shows up with finished language. The crypto firms had spent two years drafting model rules, hiring former regulators, and rehearsing their arguments. The banks showed up to a fight that was already half-scored.
So the agencies wrote fast. And fast, in practice, meant deferring to the parties who handed them the most usable text.
Consider who runs the office at the center of all this. Jonathan Gould, Trump's Comptroller of the Currency, spent part of the Biden years as chief legal officer at a blockchain firm before returning to government to oversee the banks and issuers he once advised.
His office moved early. The OCC granted preliminary trust-bank charters to stablecoin issuers including Circle, Ripple, and Crypto.com, then began publishing the proposed rules that will govern how those same firms operate. The sequence matters. Charters first, rulebook second.
None of that is illegal. Revolving doors spin in both directions, and a regulator who understands an industry can write sharper rules than one who doesn't. But understanding and sympathy are hard to separate when the same person does both jobs.
The cleaner work came from Treasury, which proposed anti-money-laundering and sanctions requirements for permitted issuers and a framework for state oversight of smaller players. Compliance obligations are the one area where the industry's incentives and the public's roughly align. Nobody legitimate wants their dollar token laundering money.
It's the structural questions, who can issue, what counts as backing, which regulator holds the leash, where the comment letters did their quiet work.
Here is the counterpoint worth holding, because the regulatory-capture story flatters everyone who tells it.
The banks did not lose because they were noble. They lost because they wanted stablecoin economics without stablecoin competition, and they wrote rules that would have let them issue while keeping rivals out. That's not consumer protection. That's a different cartel asking for the gavel.
And the framework, captured or not, produced something real. Clear rules pulled serious money off the sidelines. USDC's market value climbed to roughly $78.7 billion, growing faster than Tether for a second straight year, even as Tether's USDT held a commanding lead near $186 billion. Circle's stock became one of 2026's best-performing crypto equities, up about 30% on the year. Visa, Mastercard, BlackRock, BNY Mellon, and Stripe all run USDC in production now.
That adoption is not a side effect of the rules. It's a consequence of them. Institutions move when the legal questions stop being open.
The mistake is treating these as competing stories. They're the same story.
A captured rulebook can still grow a market. It just grows it in a particular shape, one where the incumbents who shaped the rules get the widest moat, the clearest charters, and the first-mover blessing of a regulator who already knows their general counsel by first name.
The losers aren't the banks. They're the issuers who weren't in the room, the ones who'll spend the next two years discovering that the definitions were drawn just narrowly enough to keep them out.
For an ordinary holder, the practical question is simpler and harder than any of this. When a dozen firms each issue a regulated dollar, backed by different reserves, blessed by different agencies, which one is actually safe to hold?
The disclosures exist. They're just scattered across attestation pages, charter filings, and reserve reports that share no common format. Anyone trying to compare two stablecoins side by side ends up stitching together a dozen browser tabs, which is part of why tools like The Crypto App exist, to put price, backing, and market data in one place instead of forcing every holder to become their own analyst.
That friction is the tell. A market this large should not require detective work to answer the most basic question about a product that calls itself a dollar.
The current rulemaking covers issuance. The fights it postpones, who controls the wallets, how the reserves get audited in real time, whether a foreign issuer can serve Americans, are the ones that will actually decide the shape of digital money.
Those rules will be written by the same agencies, under the same deadline pressure, courted by the same firms that just ran the table. The comment letters for round two are almost certainly already drafted. The only open question is whether anyone shows up to argue the other side before the clock runs out again.

Onuora Amobi ·

Onuora Amobi ·

Onuora Amobi ·

Onuora Amobi ·

Onuora Amobi ·

Onuora Amobi ·